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ABSTRACT
Weeds pose severe threats to agricultural and natural landscapes worldwide. One major reason 
for the failure to effectively manage weeds at landscape scales is that current Best Management 
Practice guidelines, and research on how to improve such guidelines, focus too narrowly on 
property-level management decisions. Insufficiently considered are the aggregate effects of 
individual actions to determine landscape-scale outcomes, or whether there are collective 
practices that would improve weed management outcomes. Here, we frame landscape-scale 
weed management as a social dilemma, where trade-offs occur between individual and collective
interests. We apply a transdisciplinary system approach — integrating the perspectives of 
ecologists, evolutionary biologists and agronomists into a social science theory of social 
dilemmas — to four landscape-scale weed management challenges: achieving plant biosecurity, 
preventing weed seed contamination, maintaining herbicide susceptibility, and sustainably using 
biological control. We describe how these four challenges exhibit characteristics of “public good 
problems,” wherein effective weed management requires the active contributions of multiple 
actors, while benefits are not restricted to these contributors. Adequate solutions to address these 
public good challenges often involve a subset of the eight design principles developed by Elinor 
Ostrom for “common pool social dilemmas,” together with design principles that reflect the 
public good nature of the problems. This paper is a call to action for scholars and practitioners to 
broaden our conceptualization and approaches to weed management problems. Such progress 
begins by evaluating the public good characteristics of specific weed management challenges 
and applying context-specific design principles to realize successful and sustainable weed 
management. 
Keywords: biological control; common pool resources; herbicide resistance; invasive species; 
public goods
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Introduction 
Agricultural and environmental weeds constitute a significant ecological, economic, and social 
problem that impacts natural and managed ecosystems. Weeds threaten global biodiversity1,2 
when they outcompete native species and impede services provided by the ecosystems they have 
invaded3,4. Weed scientists have developed numerous Best Management Practice (BMP) 
guidelines to support proactive, integrated strategies. Such BMPs focus on preventing the 
introduction and spread of weed seeds, improving chemical and biological control, and reducing 
the risk of resistance evolution to control options, most notably to herbicides5-7. Despite these 
BMPs and the rigorous efforts by researchers and extension personnel who promote them to land
managers, weed species continue to spread8, and management costs continue to mount as 
herbicide resistance evolves9. We suggest that a major limitation of current BMPs is an 
underappreciation for the complex, multi-scale, and collective nature of the weed problem10,11. 
We argue that BMPs will be more effective if they are complemented by landscape-scale design 
principles that encourage cross-boundary coordination and cooperation. 
To date, biophysical scientists and resource managers have mostly treated weed issues as 
ecological or agricultural problems, and social scientists have primarily investigated the 
intricacies of individuals’ weed management decisions. More recently, academics from diverse 
disciplines have recognized weed management as a “social dilemma”10,12-15. Broadly defined, 
social dilemmas are problems for which solutions require the cooperation of many individuals, 
but the benefits extend to cooperators and non-cooperators alike (i.e., the benefits are non-
excludable). Early social dilemma theories predicted that the long-term collective interests of a 
society would not accrue because individuals maximize self-interest and tend to free-ride on the 
efforts of others16. Since then, scholars have proven otherwise by documenting numerous 
examples where cooperation has manifested to produce collective goods17, demonstrating the 
practical value of this line of inquiry. Social theory has advanced to understand the collective 
nature of certain problems, offering elegant explanations and means for inspiring cooperative 
behaviour. Here, we review four landscape-scale weed management challenges through the lens 
of social dilemmas to investigate why current efforts have achieved limited success at large 
spatial scales, and propose four new design principles to enhance landscape-scale weed 
management over time. The four challenges focus on preventing the introduction or spread of 
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weeds across farms, regions, and nations, and include: (i) plant biosecurity (see footnote1)1,18, (ii) 
weed seed contamination19, (iii) herbicide susceptibility20, and (iv) biological control21.
Two broad classes of social dilemmas
Social scientists have identified two broad classes of social dilemmas: Common Pool Resources 
(CPRs) and public goods, with distinctions relevant to weed management. To date, much of the 
natural resource management literature on social dilemmas has focused on CPRs16,22. Examples 
of CPRs include fishing grounds, forests, and irrigation systems23. In these cases, the collective 
resource system is sustained when actors restrain their use of resource units24,25. Traditional 
solutions to CPR problems involve a self-interest model focused on controlling or regulating 
resource access via a central authority, or through privatizing the resource24,25. These solutions 
are referred to as “demand-side measures”26. Over time, however, scholars have provided 
substantial evidence of where CPRs have been sustainably managed without adopting the self-
interest model, instead demonstrating how community governance can overcome social 
dilemmas through reciprocal cooperation25,27. 
Ostrom22 posited eight conditions, or “Design Principles” (DPs), that enabled groups to 
effectively and sustainably manage landscape-scale common resources. The DPs have been used 
to implement and evaluate a wide range of CPR solutions, including irrigation, climate change, 
forest conservation, and fisheries across multiple scales23,28-32. Meta-analysis suggests that the 
presence of each individual DP is significantly correlated with successfully managed CPR 
systems16. Generally, the more DPs met, the more successful CPR governance is likely to be, but 
there are particular DPs that co-occur in successful CPR endeavours23. The original DPs outlined 
by Ostrom22 included: 
● DP1: boundaries of both the resource and the user group are clearly defined; 
● DP2: rules regarding the appropriation and provision of CPRs are adapted to local needs 
and conditions; 
● DP3: those affected by the rules can participate in modifying the rules; 
● DP4: monitoring resource condition and user behavior involves community members; 
● DP5: graduated sanctions are in place for rule violators; 
1 Biosecurity refers to the protection of countries against alien pests (plants, insects, vertebrates) and diseases18. Here we focus 
on plant biosecurity.
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● DP6: accessible, low-cost means for dispute resolution are available; 
● DP7: the rule-making rights of community members are respected by outside authorities; 
and 
● DP8: responsibility for governing the common resource is shared, in nested tiers from the
lowest level up to the entire interconnected system. 
In natural resource fields, public good dilemmas have received far less attention than CPRs. 
Indeed, it is often uncritically assumed that governance arrangements for CPRs are applicable to 
any social dilemma17, including public goods16. However, public goods have characteristics that 
suggest only a subset of DPs are likely relevant, and that there may be other principles critical for
success, but not yet identified or tested. Public goods require actors to actively contribute toward 
providing a resource25, which is sometimes called “supply-side solutions”26. Examples of public 
goods include green infrastructure and habitat connectivity, such as wildlife corridors and habitat
linkages. The provision of public goods depends on a range of factors33,34, including whether: (i) 
contributions accumulate incrementally or through coordination26 (i.e. “additive” vs “joint” 
contributions); (ii) all actors contribute equally with uniformly distributed benefits or not36 
(symmetrical vs asymmetrical); (iii) the overall provision is determined by the smallest or largest
contributions (i.e. “weakest-link” vs “best-shot”)37; (iv) provision of public goods requires tiered 
contributions (first- and second-order) or not34; (v) benefits accrue incrementally or if 
contributions must first surpass some baseline (i.e. threshold aggregator)38; and (vi) each 
contributor’s benefits exceed their costs even if many non-contributors benefit38. 
Weed management as a social dilemma
The existing weed management literature is inconclusive about whether weed management 
should be conceptualized as a CPR or public good social dilemma. Few studies specify which 
theory informed the design and evaluation of weed management approaches. For instance, Ervin 
and Jussaume39 presented herbicide-resistant weeds as a CPR challenge, and suggested that 
applying most of the CPR governance DPs would help improve management. On the other hand,
Ervin and Frisvold11 and Coutts et al.10 argued that weed control is a weakest-link public good, 
with Graham40 specifying that weed management is an asymmetric, repeated, and additive 
weakest-link public good. Ervin and Frisvold11 as well as Jussaume and Ervin13 recognised that 
issues such as herbicide resistance have characteristics of both CPRs and weakest-link public 
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goods. More broadly, Baggio et al.23 identified that the number of DPs needed for success may 
relate to the mobility of the resource and the amount of human investment and effort needed. 
Thus, conceptual clarity is needed to delineate the CPR and/or public good characteristics of 
different weed management challenges, as a first step toward facilitating knowledge creation and
informing successful practice. A social dilemma approach will help weed management programs
link the efforts of individuals on private properties to the broader dynamics of whole systems, 
which is crucial to enable landscape-scale changes.
Here, we critically examine CPR and public good assertions for weed management at the 
landscape scale by describing and analyzing the collective nature of four case studies, each 
representing a major contemporary weed management challenge in agricultural and natural 
landscapes. In reviewing these case studies we sought to: 1) clarify the extent to which each case 
exhibits CPR and/or public good characteristics; 2) determine if extant DPs were present or 
absent; 3) establish which of these DPs were relevant and how they were related to the 
characteristics of each social dilemma; and 4) identify additional DPs that might enhance 
proposed solutions. We also discuss context-specific considerations crucial for solving each 
challenge. As per other research that codes DPs from secondary data16,23, we found that some 
cases had insufficient information to determine if a DP was present or absent and denoted such 
ambiguities where they occurred (Table 1). 
Case study I. Plant biosecurity 
Plant biosecurity—the protection of plant resources from pests—is a key policy and regulatory 
tool that governments use to limit the intentional or accidental spread of weeds, locally and 
globally41. Plant biosecurity includes quarantine, inspection of freight at ports, and certified 
treatment schemes such as bulk fumigation of certain types of cargo. We consider plant 
biosecurity to include state and international efforts, whereas more local and farm-specific 
efforts constitute a form of weed hygiene with largely distinct players and solutions (see Case 
study II).  Plant biosecurity presents a social dilemma because some governments fail to make 
the investments necessary to protect global biodiversity, either at transnational (Case study Ia) or
sub-national scales (Case study Ib).
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Transnational plant biosecurity. The achievement of an effective transnational plant 
biosecurity system is defined as a weakest-link public good because routinely addressing new 
invasive weed threats requires the ongoing efforts (i.e. contributions) of all countries41. Success 
is determined by the level of plant biosecurity provided by the most lax actor (the weakest-
link)41. It has been shown theoretically42,43 and experimentally44 that weakest-link characteristics 
reduce the likelihood of contributions, especially in larger groups. 
Achieving transnational plant biosecurity is challenging in part because of these social dynamics,
as illustrated by the International Cargo Cooperative Biosecurity Arrangement (ICCBA). The 
ICCBA was established in 2013 to harmonize treatment of cargo-related biosecurity risks, yet 
has achieved limited participation and was not designed to maximize collective action. Notably, 
the ICCBA was made voluntary, with non-binding agreements, and only counted 20 signatories 
by 201945. While the boundaries and actors were clearly defined (DP1) and those who signed the 
initial agreement were able to negotiate the terms (DP3), there was limited capacity to adapt the 
rules to local conditions (DP2). Furthermore, no mechanisms were established for monitoring 
signatory contributions or reductions in biosecurity risks (DP4), sanctioning (DP5), or conflict-
resolution (DP6). It remains unclear whether the rule-making rights of signatories are being 
respected by governments who are not signatories (DP7), or whether opportunities for nested 
governance are employed (DP8). Additionally, the success of the endeavour has been difficult to 
determine due to a lack of monitoring. 
Similar design challenges face other organizational coalitions who work together to produce 
weed management-related public goods46.  When organizations cannot monitor and sanction one 
another, such as in international arrangements like the ICCBA, it becomes imperative that 
members not only agree to a shared goal, but clearly articulate what their contribution will be 
and how they will hold themselves accountable. At local levels, there is evidence that the 
provision of weakest-link weed management-related public goods are more likely to be achieved 
when members collectively support the weakest-link actor47. Thus, ICCBA would benefit from 
focusing on the weakest-link characteristics of the dilemma to reduce the introduction of weeds 
through multinational biosecurity collaboration. Support to members with the lowest capacity to 
contribute could take the form of specifying and reviewing individual contributions, developing 
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self-reporting accountability forums, expanding the membership base, or increasing the pool of 
resources.   
Sub-national plant biosecurity. In contrast to international approaches, sub-national plant 
biosecurity policies allow for more control by individual nations, making it easier to achieve 
biosecurity governance. For example, Australia is recognised for its concerted biosecurity 
efforts, including committing significant investments toward achieving biosecurity at sub-
national scales. In 2012, the Intergovernmental Agreement on Biosecurity established a 
cooperative partnership among all but one Australian states and territories, signing agreement on 
a common goal. Consistent with DP1, this involved clearly defined boundaries determining who 
was required to contribute to the public good of an “effective national biosecurity system”48. 
While this agreement helped various levels of Australian government jointly identify priority 
areas, it also capitalized on nested biosecurity systems (DP8). All Australian states and territories
have revised or renewed their biosecurity legislation in the past decade (DP2), which is respected
by other sub-national and national governments, i.e. external authorities (DP7). The sub-national 
biosecurity legislation determined who was required to provide, monitor, and enforce biosecurity
(DP8), and specified graduated sanctions for those who did not contribute (DP5). Across most 
states and territories, decisions about which weeds to declare as noxious and corresponding 
control requirements are determined by local governments49. Thus, biosecurity rules are tailored 
to local conditions (DP2) and individuals affected by the rules are empowered to influence the 
rules by lobbying their local councils and politicians (DP3). However, courts have been involved
when conflicts have arisen, meaning resolution mechanisms are not low-cost (DP6 absent). 
There is little evidence of consistent monitoring of reductions in plant biosecurity risks, and 
weed officers who monitor biosecurity at local scales are rarely land managers (DP4 absent), yet 
past research has shown that weed officers are more likely to be respected when they have long-
term ties to the community50. While six of the eight DPs are evident in management of the plant 
biosecurity public good in Australia, and there are strong working relationships among the small 
number of government actors involved, it is difficult to determine whether these DPs are 
necessary or sufficient for reducing biosecurity risks because of the lack of monitoring. The lack 
of monitoring also makes it challenging to identify any particular sub-national actor as the 
weakest link, and how to effectively support them if needed.  
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Case study II. Weed seed contamination
Weeds, especially close relatives of crops, are common contaminants of crop seeds. For 
example, weedy rice (Oryza sativa) is a noxious weed that threatens global rice production51. 
Weedy rice grains are more brittle52, have different nutritional qualities53, and may have red 
pigmentation that reduces polished rice quality54. Due to its propensity for seed shattering and 
long seed dormancy, weedy rice is an efficient and pernicious invader51,55. Season-long weedy 
rice competition causes up to 80% yield loss in rice56 and can substantially reduce marketable 
grain quality57. Due to the importance of cultivated rice in global diet, weedy rice can adversely 
affect global food security if not adequately controlled58.
Hygienic production BMPs minimize the introduction and spread of weedy rice across fields. 
They include purchasing and planting certified weed-free rice seeds19 and thoroughly cleaning 
farm machinery and vehicles before moving from one field to another, particularly when shared 
among farmers59. The adoption of hygienic BMPs presents a social dilemma because a weedy 
rice-free agricultural landscape requires hygienic BMPs by all rice farmers (i.e., contributions). 
This is an example of an additive public good because it is supplied on a continuous basis60. The 
social dilemma of weedy rice is global in scale51, but plays out at regional or local levels.
The benefits of weed hygienic BMPs largely accrue to contributors and non-contributors alike. 
When one individual achieves weedy-rice-free fields, everyone benefits because propagule 
pressure is reduced61. The more collective resources invested to achieve weedy-rice-free fields, 
the greater the public benefits: reduced weed management costs, and improved rice yields, grain 
quality, and profits. Reduced risk of contamination by neighbours’ operations lowers individual 
weed hygiene costs and increases the quality of seeds, giving farmers access to a greater share of 
the market and enabling them to receive price premiums62. 
Uruguay presents a notable example of where stringent weed hygiene measures have been 
implemented, with about 90% of rice area planted with certified weed-free seeds63. Uruguay has 
180,000 ha of irrigated rice production located along the border with Brazil63. Boundaries of the 
public good are clearly defined, as are the people responsible for contributing to it (DP1). In 
1997, the National Seed Institute (INASE) was established to encourage the production and use 
of certified high-quality seed and stimulate the development of the national seed industry (i.e. the
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shared goal)64. The national seed industry is a second-order public good that delivers the first-
order public good of a weedy-rice-free agricultural landscape. Rice producers and members of 
the Seed Users Commission (Comisión de Usarios de Semillas) are on the INASE Board of 
Directors and are responsible for determining how the organization is run (DP3). INASE sets the 
rules of how high-quality seed is to be produced, certified, commercialized, exported, and 
imported (DP2). It determines and applies sanctions for breaking the rules (Ley No 16.811, 
Uruguay; DP5), while agronomists monitor farmers’ fields on a regular basis for any weed seed 
contamination (DP4)65. The provision of high-quality seed is assured through well-established 
collaborations among producer and research organisations (DP8), who have worked on a range 
of rice research projects over the past 40 years66, and who work together to deliver certified rice 
seed at affordable prices every year (DP2)67. There is insufficient information to determine 
whether low-cost conflict-resolution mechanisms are in place (DP6 unknown) or whether other 
government authorities recognise the rights of INASE to organize (DP7 unknown). 
Even though creating a weedy-rice-free agricultural landscape is a public good social dilemma, 
this case study demonstrates that having a shared goal as well as six of the eight DPs created 
favorable conditions for continuous provisioning of this additive public good, with little 
adaptation required (Table 1). These conditions have been enabled in Uruguay through additive 
efforts over the past 75 years to build strong working relationships among farmers, millers, and 
the government66. Beyond the DPs, there is evidence that various actors have committed to, and 
work together towards, a shared goal with clear expectations of each others’ contributions. 
Transparency in the system65,66 offers accountability, not just for the land managers providing the 
first-order public good (i.e., weedy-rice-free landscape), but also for those who contribute to the 
second-order public good (i.e., the national seed industry). If the success in Uruguay is to be 
replicated elsewhere, it seems policy makers should focus on the first five and last DPs, ensure 
collective goals are shared, and the system is transparent.  
Case study III. Herbicide susceptibility
Herbicide-resistant weed biotypes are proliferating exponentially and threatening farm 
productivity and profitability68; at least 60 countries have reported herbicide-resistant weed 
biotypes, including more than 400 species-herbicide group combinations69. Treating herbicide-
resistant weeds costs around $4 billion annually in the United States (US) alone70. The evolution 
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and spread of herbicide resistance in Palmer amaranth (Amaranthus palmeri S. Wats.) across the 
US is an example of a social dilemma pertaining to the maintenance of herbicide susceptibility in
an agricultural landscape. 
Glyphosate resistance in Palmer amaranth was first confirmed in 2005 in Georgia71, and has been
subsequently reported in over 25 US states68. Multiple resistance (i.e., to more than one herbicide
site of action) is also commonly reported in this species across the US (catalogued by Heap68), a 
problem analogous to pathogens resistant to multiple antibiotics72. The occurrence of herbicide-
resistant Palmer amaranth has been attributed to a lack of management diversity73 and the 
dispersal of resistant weed propagules across agricultural landscapes74,75. In response to 
widespread herbicide resistance in Palmer amaranth, BMPs have been developed and shared 
with farmers6,76 that were designed to fit local production systems and geared towards managing 
existing resistance as well as preventing new cases through proactive resistance management. 
Though adoption has been substantial77, BMPs have focused on farm-scale management 
decisions by individual farmers, rather than collaborative actions at  broader community levels.
Weed susceptibility to herbicides has characteristics that reflect CPR as well as public 
goods11,13,39. While herbicide susceptibility can be conceptualised as an exhaustible CPR problem,
which requires users to restrain their use pattern of particular herbicides, we argue it has public 
good characteristics that also need to be recognised. Continued preservation of herbicide 
susceptibility of weed communities is a public good because it requires all farmers to diversify 
their management actions (i.e., contributions), which may incur additional expenses and 
inconvenience in the short-term, but will benefit all farmers in the agricultural landscape over the
long-term. Weed species susceptibility to herbicides can be undermined if one farmer repeatedly 
applies the most economically-attractive or convenient herbicide without implementing 
diversified weed management strategies. Once weed resistance has evolved on one farm, it can 
spread rapidly via seed and pollen74,78. Thus, susceptibility to herbicides is also a weakest-link 
public good, and mimics the weed hygiene public good because the spread of herbicide 
resistance across fields and landscapes can be minimized by improved weed hygiene practices79.
Ervin and Frisvold11 advocate for a community-based approach to resolve the social dilemma 
posed by herbicide resistance in weeds. A community-based approach encourages participation 
of neighboring farms in managing resistance spread80. For example, a community-based “zero 
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tolerance” program was implemented in the Clay and Crittenden counties of Arkansas to manage
Palmer amaranth81. This program has rallied farmers, crop consultants, policy makers, and 
extension personnel around the shared goal of eliminating Palmer amaranth from the region (i.e.,
a “zero-tolerance” zone). Thus, the program has clearly defined the geographical region of the 
problem and identified people who can contribute to herbicide susceptibility (DP1). Yet, 
implementation of the zero-tolerance strategy in a given landscape is voluntary and largely 
dependent on individual farmers’ willingness to adopt BMPs. 
The zero-tolerance program led to a rapid decline in Palmer amaranth seedbank densities within 
the first few years of program implementation82. This occurred despite the lack of rules regarding
how herbicide susceptibility should be managed (DPs 2, 3 absent) and a lack of graduated 
sanctions to punish non-cooperators (DP5 absent), conflict resolution mechanisms (DP6 absent) 
and monitoring schemes (DP4 absent). There is some evidence that the rights of contributors are 
recognised by external government authorities (DP7), the county extension agents promoted the 
program, and nested enterprises such as the Natural Resource Conservation Service were 
actively involved (DP8)81. This suggests that the majority of DPs of CPR governance may not be 
critical requirements if community and local institutions subscribe to the shared goal. Yet, like 
other weed management-related public goods, the collective response was enhanced by a forum 
through which stakeholders could appreciate the cross-boundary nature of the problem, commit 
to weed control on the diverse land types that they were responsible for, and witness first-hand 
the benefits of coordinating toward achievable goals46.  
Case study IV. Weed biological control
Classical weed biological control (biocontrol) employs host-specific arthropods or pathogens 
(i.e. agents) from a weed’s native environment to reduce weed populations in invaded systems. 
These strategies typically have high benefit to cost ratios due to long-lasting, low input costs 
(agents are self-sustaining once established), and provide management options for remote areas 
or habitats where other tools are unavailable or impractical83-85. However, biocontrol agents, as 
living interacting organisms, can impose irrevocable change to the ecosystem, with pre-release 
predictions about the efficacy and potential consequences that can only be assessed once the 
agent is established and widely dispersed. Hence, the deployment of biocontrol as an effective 
and environmentally safe weed management tool is hindered by several social challenges.
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Despite the documented success of past programs86,87, persistent knowledge gaps and 
uncertainties about how weed biocontrol agents will behave upon release (e.g., dispersal88 and 
efficacy85,89) inhibit our ability to accurately delimit physical boundaries for agents on landscapes
or adapt rules ahead of their use for weed management (DPs 1, 2 inhibited). The potential for 
negative ecological impacts can cause conflicts with previously unidentified stakeholders (DPs 1,
3, 6 challenged), particularly with respect to the risks to non-target native plants90,91. Finally, the 
high initial costs of research and development92 (i.e., overseas exploration and required host 
range testing of agents pre-release) can result in an unequal distribution of investments, 
complicating rule-making, and challenging conflict resolution (DPs 3, 6-8 challenged).  End-
users are often unwilling to individually incur the short-term development costs necessary for 
long-term success of the program. This front-end problem is addressed collectively by 
establishing funding consortia and leveraging  public investments. In these ways, biocontrol 
resembles an asymmetric public good: there is an imbalance between initial contributors (e.g., 
public agencies, non-profit research organizations) and those dependent on the outcome (e.g., 
private and public land managers). Such uneven distributions present significant production 
challenges that hinge on beneficiaries contributing to development93. 
The houndstongue (Cynoglossum officinale L.) biocontrol program in western North America 
provides one example of how asymmetrical public good issues in biocontrol can nevertheless be 
effectively addressed. In the 1980s, economic impacts by this rangeland weed to the British 
Columbia (BC) cattle industry led the Canadian government, the BC provincial government, and 
the BC Cattlemen’s Association to establish a consortium that shared front-end costs of a 
houndstongue biocontrol program94. This consortium, which later included stakeholder groups 
from neighbouring US states, collectively set general program goals and pooled funds to contract
an international not-for-profit organization (i.e., the Centre for Agriculture and Biosciences 
International) to undertake agent exploration and pre-release testing95. In 1997, the biocontrol 
agent Mogulones crucifer Pallas (Curculionidae) was approved for release in Canada and proved 
highly successful, establishing well at all release sites and significantly reducing weed 
population densities within two years96. 
Early successes increased demand for the biocontrol agent, and government research and 
development investments shifted to its mass-production97. Agents were provided first to 
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stakeholders who funded the initial development, as well as mass-production research (e.g., 
cattlemen associations, railway and power companies), thus rewarding those who contributed to 
the public good. Excess agents were then distributed to private and public land managers in BC 
and Alberta, Canada, until agents propagated and spread independently95, extending benefits 
beyond initial investors. This is a notable example of a “threshold aggregator” problem where 
public benefits accrue only after sufficient contributions have been made by early participants.
Although governments initially monitored agent distribution, use, and impact (DP4), this ceased 
once the agent began dispersing and controlling houndstongue more widely. During the early 
stages of agent development and use, there were clearly defined contributors and non-
contributors (DP1), proportionality was established between those who provided inputs and those
who received the benefits (DP2), the right to organise was not challenged by other government 
authorities (DP7), and nested enterprises were involved in provision of the public good (DP8). 
Within the Canadian context, the houndstongue biocontrol program has provided a public good 
with half of the DPs, although including others may have led to a more efficient or effective 
process. The use of pooled funds and rewards helped address the asymmetrical aspects of the 
public good, and the transparent contributions may explain why no graduated sanctions (DP5 
absent) or conflict-resolution mechanisms (DP6 absent) were evident. Similar to the herbicide 
susceptibility case, members of the initial funding consortia shared similar values and needs 
about rural weed management. However, early involvement of other stakeholders with different 
values and perspectives pertaining to the weed and its management (e.g., conservation groups 
concerned about risks to native non-targets), might have facilitated biocontrol development and 
use, while ensuring more inclusive, broad-based project support as the biocontrol agent 
continued to spread85.  In cases where conflicts of interest in the use of biocontrol arise due to 
differing values, inadequate stakeholder consultations about common goals can significantly 
delay and increase the costs of a biocontrol program21. As such, broader co-design and 
development are being recognized as important to the continued use of biocontrol83,85. Here, 
application of additional DPs (Table 2) could have contributed a much needed process for 
developing a more inclusive goal in houndstongue management, while creating greater 
transparency and awareness of the benefits and risks involved.
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As the houndstongue biocontrol agent spreads across the Canada-US border, additional and 
ongoing social challenges emerge. Although there are no clearly defined physical boundaries for 
houndstongue biocontrol (portion of DP1 absent), the political boundary between countries has 
delayed and complicated the use of the agent as a public good. The US has not given regulatory 
approval for release of M. crucifer on its lands due to potential impacts on a non-target 
endangered plant closely related to the weed95,98. Moreover, the US declared the agent a ‘federal 
pest’, legally prohibiting its deliberate movement and use (DP7)99, and creating tensions between 
regulatory agencies upholding non-target protections and those in the US wanting the agent. 
Currently, there are no low-cost conflict-resolution mechanisms available to manage these 
tensions (DP6 absent), and US stakeholders have few options for modifying operational rules 
(i.e., US federal regulations) that could enable them to benefit from the public good (DP3 absent 
in this situation)100. Additional DPs (Table 2) may have also helped in a transnational context by 
enabling durable cross-border collaboration (e.g., an earlier agreement between the US and 
Canada to more closely align their regulatory policies on what is an acceptable risk for agent 
release). However, it is no easy task bridging transnational differences in legislation, politics, or 
societal perceptions of biocontrol83,85. Future programs could benefit from exploring the DPs as a 
strategic framework supporting biocontrol from project inception to widespread acceptance and 
use as a public good. 
Conclusion 
Weed management often requires the collective action of myriads of stakeholders, including but 
not limited to land managers, weed scientists, industry, practitioners, and policy makers. Local 
circumstances, both natural and socio-political, as well as competing interests among 
stakeholders, create unique social dilemmas in weed management. The current literature helps 
guide efforts to study and address some of the most difficult problems in weed management, yet 
lack of conceptual clarity has limited knowledge creation. Specifically, CPR theory and 
associated DPs have been applied uncritically and the “public good” nature of weed management
has been under-appreciated even in cases where it has high relevance. As highlighted here, 
achieving plant biosecurity and preventing herbicide resistance both resemble weakest-link 
public good problems, biocontrol presents asymmetrical public good characteristics, and weed 
hygiene requires the provision of additive, first- and second-order public goods. 
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The public goods view of the specific weed management challenges highlighted here, among 
many such issues, is compatible with certain DPs laid out for effective and equitable CPR 
governance by Ostrom22. Baggio et al.23 previously concluded that DPs 1 2, 4, and 6 were 
necessary, but not sufficient for successful management of a range of CPRs, and that DPs 5 and 
8 were less essential for success. We found that DPs 1, 2, 3, and 8 were the most likely to apply, 
whereas DPs 4, 5, and 6 were the least important (Table 1) across the four challenges we 
examined. More often than not, there was little evidence about the presence of DP7, preventing 
definitive conclusions about its necessity. Critically for DP1, we found that identifying 
contributors was more important than establishing the boundaries of the public good problem, a 
significant departure from CPR theory. 
Evaluating which DPs are important is challenged by few examples where successes or failures 
of weed management programs have been monitored or measured. Thus, although monitoring 
systems were often absent, they are likely a critical condition enabling weed management 
programs to adapt and facilitating actors to establish new rules as necessary. Even when a 
monitoring program is in place, assessing success can be a non-trivial task. For example, the 
number of species moved around the world is growing with increasing trade101, but does this 
represent a failure? Without any biosecurity efforts, the situation could be worse. Having no 
counterfactual evidence thwarts definitive conclusions. Thus, policy makers should not only 
consider which DPs are necessary for effective weed management, but also whether there is 
capacity for other DPs to be useful in future contexts.
Mechanisms for establishing graduated sanctions (DP5) are imperative to enhance collective 
weed management outcomes in agricultural and natural landscapes102. However, such sanctions 
were absent in three of the cases described above: transnational biosecurity (case Ia), herbicide 
susceptibility (case III) and biocontrol (case IV) (Table 1). Furthermore, the stringency of 
enforcement can influence the level of weed management outcomes. Beyond established CPR 
DPs, we identified four additional principles important to all or some of the cases we examined 
(Table 2). These included: 1) having a clearly articulated shared goal and securing commitments 
from actors to contribute; 2) establishing good working relationships and shared values among 
contributors; 3) making individual contributions transparent; and 4) generating pooled resources 
to support weakest-link problems or address asymmetries in the public good. These principles 
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emphasize the importance of considering whether specific types of weed management have 
public good characteristics, and the type of public good that applies. 
Because public goods require active contributions, shared goals and approaches must respect the 
unique perspectives and diverse capacities of contributors. Achieving such an agreement requires
good working relationships, or at least shared values, where contributors are willing to 
transparently demonstrate their efforts and contribute shared resources to help those who are 
least able to contribute. As the additional DPs have been derived from a small set of cases, future
research is needed to identify the extent to which these DPs are sufficient or necessary for 
managing other weed-related public good challenges, the extent to which these DPs are required 
for diverse types of public goods, and whether there are other public-good specific DPs that 
require attention. 
The novel perspective illustrated here may not be specific to the case studies presented, and 
considering these dilemmas jointly through a CPR and public good lens highlights the broader 
social vision required for successful weed management. Engagement processes are needed to 
encourage, increase, and broaden stakeholder involvement; for instance, platforms supporting 
evidence-based debates and meaningful participation by those with diverse interests, knowledge, 
and skill sets103. We believe that the approach presented here likely applies to a majority of 
landscape-scale weed management issues beyond the case-studies described, yet acknowledge 
that case-specific analyses are imperative for confirming the existence of social dilemmas, 
application of specific DPs, and a more general identification of suitable strategies for successful
weed management. 
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Table 1. Application of Ostrom’s Design Principles (DP) of Common Pool Resource (CPR) governance 
for addressing weed management-related public good governance
Particulars Case study
I(a). Trans-
national plant
biosecurity
I(b). Sub-
national plant
biosecurity
(Australia)
II. Weed seed
contami-
nation in
Uruguay
III. Herbicide
susceptibility
in the
Southern USA
IV. Biological
control in
Canada and
across the US
border
Public Good Characteristics
Weakest-link
Weakest-link
Additive, first-
and second-
order
Weakest-link Asymmetric
CPR Design Principles*
DP1: Boundaries of the resource 
and the user groups are clearly 
defined ✓
✓ ✓ ✓ ~
DP2: Rules regarding the 
appropriation and provision of 
CPRs are adapted to local needs 
and conditions 
x
✓ ✓ x ✓
DP3: Those affected by the rules 
can participate in modifying the 
rules ✓
✓ ✓ x ~
DP4: Monitoring of resource 
condition and user behavior 
involves community members            x
x ✓ x ~
DP5: Graduated sanctions are in 
place for rule violators 
x
✓ ✓ x x
DP6: Accessible, low-cost means 
for dispute resolution are 
available            x
x x x
DP7: The rule-making rights of 
community members are 
respected by outside authorities
✓
DP8: Responsibility for 
governing the common resource is
shared in nested tiers from the 
lowest level up to the entire 
interconnected system
✓ ✓ ✓
*Green cells ( ) indicate that there is evidence that the DP applies for the specific case study; orange 
cells (x) indicate that there is evidence that the DP does not apply; blue cells (~) indicate that only part of 
the DP applies; and grey cells (no symbols) indicate that there is insufficient information about whether 
or not the specific DP applies. 
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Table 2. Additional Design Principles (DP) relevant to addressing weed management-related public good
governance* 
Particulars Case study
I(a). Trans-
national
plant
biosecurity
I(b). Sub-
national
plant
biosecurity
(Australia)
II. Weed
seed
contami-
nation in
Uruguay
III. Herbicide
susceptibility in
the Southern
USA
IV. Biological
control in
Canada and
across the US
border
Contributors agree to a
shared goal 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Contributions are 
made transparently
✓ ✓ ✓
Contributors pool 
resources to support 
weakest-links or 
address asymmetries 
in the public good
✓ ✓
Strong working 
relationships or shared
values among 
contributors ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
*Green cells ( ) indicate that there is evidence that the DP applies for the specific case study; and grey 
cells (no symbols) indicate that there is insufficient information about whether or not the specific DP 
applies.
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